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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF VICTIM IMPACT
STATEMENTS: PAYNE V. TENNESSEE,
111 S. CT. 2597 (1991)
The sentencing stage of a criminal proceeding gives the sentencing
authority an opportunity to evaluate whether a particular penalty is
suitable for a convicted defendant.1 Recently, many state legislatures
have allowed sentencing bodies to consider victim impact evidence2
before arriving at a decision.' This evidence permits a sentencing au-
thority to consider a crime's effect on the victim and his or her family.4
The admissibility of victim impact evidence at capital sentencing hear-
ings provides a unique challenge to the Supreme Court's construction
1. In a capital punishment proceeding, the sentencing authority decides whether to
sentence the defendant to death or otherwise. See generally GEORGE E. Dix & M.
MICHAEL SHARLOT, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 17-27 (West 3d ed.
1984).
2. The concept of victim impact evidence dates back to 1978 when legislatures re-
acted to the victim's rights movement. For an explanation of the history of the move-
ment, see generally Frank Carrington & George Nicholson, The Victims' Movement. An
Idea Whose Time Has Come, 11 PEPP. L. REv. 1 (184) (discussing the rise of the
victims' rights movement over the last several decades). Today, this concept refers to
three types of information: (1) the personal characteristics of the victim, (2) the emo-
tional impact of the crimes on surviving family members, and (3) the family members'
opinions and characterizations of the crimes and of the defendant- Brief for Petitioner
at 11, Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991) (No. 90-5721) [hereinafter Brief for
Petitioner] (discussing the factors held by the Court in Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S.
496, 502-03 (1987), to be irrelevant and constitutionally inadmissable in capital sentenc-
ing cases).
3. As of 1990, at least 43 states had provisions in their respective state criminal laws
to allow a sentencing authority to consider the impact that a crime had on its victim.
The following are examples of legislation: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1406 & 1005-
4-1(6) (Smith-Hurd 1982 & Supp. 1991); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 390.30(3)(b) (Mc-
Kinney 1983 & Supp. 1991); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2947.05.1 (Anderson 1982);
TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 56.02 - 56.03 (West 1979 & Supp. 1991).
4. In Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), for example, the victim impact evi-
dence, which the Court held constitutionally inadmissible, included comments by the
children and granddaughter of the murder victims about the victims' outstanding per-
sonal qualities, emotional problems that surviving family members must face, and phys-
ical sufferings in the family. Id. at 499-500.
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of Eighth Amendment guarantees.5 These guarantees must be pre-
served when citizens face the possibility of society's most severe pun-
ishment.6 In Payne v. Tennessee,7 the Court overruled two recent high
court decisions' and held that the Eighth Amendment does not pro-
hibit presentation of victim impact evidence to a capital sentencing
jury.
In Payne, the petitioner was convicted on two counts of first degree
murder for killing a woman and her baby daughter, and was sentenced
to death for each.9 At sentencing, the State presented testimony from
the murdered woman's mother who described how the murders af-
5. The Eighth Amendment provides, "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor ex-
cessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII.
6. Great debate centers around what the phrase "cruel and unusual punishment"
encompasses. At the simplest level, the debate hinges on whether the sentencing au-
thority should apply the death penalty solely on the basis of the physical act committed,
or whether it may apply the more severe penalty due to the physical act's repercussions.
See, e.g., Kevin J. McCoy, Comment, Preserving Integrity in Capital Sentencing: Booth
v. Maryland, 22 CREIGHTON L. REv. 333 (1988) (agreeing with the Court's use of
heightened scrutiny in capital cases regarding victim impact evidence). See generally
WALTER R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 2.14(f) (2d ed.
1986) (asserting that the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment includes
three aspects: (1) limiting the method of punishment, (2) limiting the amount of punish-
ment prescribed for a given offense, and (3) barring penal sanctions in certain contexts).
The Court has stated that the Eighth Amendment "must draw its meaning from
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion) (noting that it was cruel and unusual
punishment to revoke the United States citizenship of a military deserter). See also
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 289-93 (1976) (discussing how the meaning
of cruel and unusual punishment evolved as society's standards changed: after the
Eighth Amendment was adopted in 1791, the states first followed the common-law
practice of making the death sentence mandatory for certain offenses, but then jury
determinations and legislative enactments reduced the number of capital offenses).
7. 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
8. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989); Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S.
496 (1987).
9. Tennessee v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10 (Tenn. 1990). Payne was convicted for mur-
dering 28 year-old Charisse Christopher and her 2 year-old daughter Lacie. Id. at 11.
He was also convicted of assault with intent to commit murder in the first degree upon
Charisse's 3 year-old son Nicholas who survived multiple stab wounds. Id. at 11-12.
The evidence showed that Payne spent the morning and early afternoon of the incident
drinking beer and injecting cocaine. 111 S. Ct. at 2601. Later in the afternoon,
Charisse resisted Payne's sexual advances in her apartment. Upon resistance, Payne
became violent and used a butcher knife to stab the three family members. Id. at 2601-
02.
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fected her daughter's surviving young son."0 Additionally, in his clos-
ing argument seeking the death penalty, the prosecutor referred to the
continuing effects of the crime on the young boy. 1 The Tennessee
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction holding that the grandmother's
testimony was "technically irrelevant," but not fatal to the imposition
of the death penalty, and that the closing argument was "harmless be-
yond a reasonable doubt."' 2 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari 3 and requested briefs on whether the Court should
overrule its holdings in Booth v. Maryland 4 and South Carolina v.
Gathers. 5 The holdings in those cases precluded capital sentencing
juries from considering victim impact evidence.16 The Supreme Court
in Payne affirmed the decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court and
held that the Eighth Amendment does not erect a per se bar to prohibit
a capital sentencing authority from considering evidence about the vic-
tim's personal characteristics and the crime's emotional impact on the
victim's family. 7
10. When the prosecution asked how the young boy was affected by the murders,
the victim's mother responded:
He cries for his mom. He doesn't seem to understand why she doesn't come home.
And he cries for his sister Lacie. He comes to me many times during the week and
asks me, "Grandmama, do you miss my Lacie?" And I tell him yes. He says "I'm
worried about my Lacie."
111 S. Ct. at 2603.
11. The prosecutor argued for the death penalty and noted the effects of the murder
on Nicholas, "But we do know that Nicholas was alive. And Nicholas was in the same
room. Nicholas was still conscious. His eyes were open. He responded to the
paramedics. He was able to follow their directions .... So he knew what happened to
his mother and baby sister." Id.
During closing argument, the prosecutor recounted the effects on Nicholas and con-
cluded, "These are the things that go into why it is especially cruel and heinous and
atrocious, the burden that that child will carry forever." Id.
12. 791 S.W.2d at 16-18.
13. 111 S. Ct. 1031 (1991).
14. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987). The Court addressed the constitution-
ality of victim impact evidence for the first time in Booth, invalidating a Maryland stat-
ute which required a sentencing jury to consider such evidence. See infra notes 48-63
and accompanying text for further discussion of the Booth case.
15. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989). The Court refined its analysis
of victim impact evidence when it extended the Booth holding to include a prohibition
forbidding a prosecutor from commenting to the jury about a victim's personal charac-
teristics. Id. at 811. See infra notes 64-75 and accompanying text for further discussion
of the Gathers case.
16. 111 S. Ct. 1031 (1991).
17. The Court, however, limited its holding and did not disrupt the holding in
Booth which prohibited victim impact evidence concerning a victim's family's charac-
19921
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Since the landmark decision of Furman v. Georgia, 8 which found
the death penalty unconstitutional as applied to three petitioners,19 the
Court has often grappled with the role of the Eighth Amendment in
the capital punishment context. 20 In his concurrence to the Furman
per curiam opinion, Justice Brennan noted that the legal community
has very little evidence of the framers' intent regarding the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishment., 21
Justice White added that a state's use of the death penalty should be
discontinued as unconstitutionally cruel and inhumane because it was
so infrequently imposed. This infrequent use creates "no meaningful
basis" for distinguishing between the few cases when the death penalty
is administered from the many cases in which it is not.22 In his dissent
in Furman, Justice Blackmun anticipated the issue ultimately resolved
in Payne. In that dissent, he admonished the Court for not incorporat-
ing the misery endured by victims and their families into its discussion
of capital sentencing.23 The controversy surrounding victim impact
evidence increased in the 1980,s,24 and the volatility surrounding the
issue is not likely to dissipate in light of the Court's reversal of deci-
terizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence.
Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2611 & n.2. For an explanation of this type of evidence, see infra
note 56.
18. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
19. Furman dealt with three petitioners who challenged the application of a Geor-
gia death penalty statute. The petitioners were two convicted rapists and a convicted
murderer. The Court found the Georgia sentencing scheme unconstitutional under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 239-40. Justice Douglas reasoned that one
of the purposes of the Eighth Amendment is to "require legislatures to write penal laws
that are even-handed, nonselective, and nonarbitrary." Id. at 256 (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
20. See infra notes 29-75 and accompanying text discussing the Court's past treat-
ment of this issue.
21. 408 U.S. at 258 (Brennan, J., concurring). The Court has recently commented
that, at a minimum, the Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments considered cruel
and unusual at the time that the Bill of Rights was adopted. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492
U.S. 302, 330 (1989) (holding that the Eighth Amendment bars the execution of insane
prisoners) (citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986)). However, the Court
still feels that the remaining boundaries of this ambiguous clause must be found in soci-
ety's "evolving standards." Penry, 492 U.S. at 330-31 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 101 (1958)).
22. 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
23. Id. at 414 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "[T]he terror that occasioned (the crimes)
... deserves not to be entirely overlooked." Id.
24. See Carrington & Nicholson, supra note 2 for a discussion of the rise of the
victim's rights movement.
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sions only five years old.25
To address the contemporary issues that victim impact evidence
presents, the Court looked to its prior Eighth Amendment decisions.
Admitting victim impact evidence requires the Court to analyze evi-
dence concerning the victim in addition to the circumstances surround-
ing the defendant's act. The Court's previous rulings in death penalty
cases, however, focus specifically on how state laws treat defendants.
In general, the Court extrapolated from two categories of cases to con-
clude that the Eighth Amendment is not a bar to victim impact evi-
dence. The first category deals with the control that a state must
exercise over the sentencer in capital sentencing hearings.2 6 The sec-
ond category mandates that the sentencing body accept large amounts
of mitigating evidence to individualize the capital defendant.27 The
Payne Court found that the state could still maintain adequate control
over capital sentencing authorities despite the introduction of victim
impact evidence. The Court also concluded that the sentencing au-
thority's unique consideration of a capital defendant does not preclude
the prosecution's introduction of the harm caused.
The first progeny began after Furman, 2 8 when the Court, in Gregg v.
Georgia,29 examined whether Georgia's capital sentencing statute nec-
essarily ensured objectivity for the capital sentencing body.3 0 In Gregg,
a petitioner convicted for the armed robbery and murder of two men
25. In Payne, the Court noted that Booth and Gathers are based on two premises:
(1) that the harm caused by a capital defendant to a victim's family does not generally
reflect on a defendant's "blameworthiness;" and (2) that the defendant's blameworthi-
ness is the only evidence relevant for a capital sentencing authority. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at
2605. The Court rejected these tenets and instead focused on the totality of harm that a
crime causes. Id. at 2606.
26. For a discussion of these types of cases, see supra notes 28-42 and accompany-
ing text.
27. For a discussion of these types of cases, see supra notes 43-47 and accompany-
ing text.
28. For a discussion of Furman v. Georgia, see supra notes 18-25 and accompany-
ing text.
29. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion).
30. The Georgia death penalty statute read:
Mitigating and aggravating circumstances; death penalty
(a) The death penalty may be imposed for the offenses of aircraft hijacking or
treason, in any case.
(b) In all cases of other offenses for which the death penalty may be authorized,
the judge shall consider, or he shall include in his instructions to the jury for it to
consider, any mitigating circumstances or aggravating circumstances otherwise au-
1992]
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appealed the jury's imposition of the death penalty.3 The petitioner
argued that Georgia's capital sentencing statute was applied arbitrarily
and was therefore unconstitutional. 32 The Court found that the Eighth
Amendment is not a per se bar on capital punishment,33 and held that
Georgia's statute did not violate the Eighth Amendment because it
properly focused the jury's attention to the particular crime and the
defendant. 34 The Court also explained that the Georgia legislature had
satisfactorily amended the statute to conform with the structures of
Furman because it provided for appellate review and consistency
among death sentences.35
thorized by law and any of the following statutory aggravating circumstances
which may be supported by the evidence.
(c) The statutory instructions as determined by the trial judge to be warranted by
the evidence shall be given in charge and in writing to the jury for its deliberation.
The jury, if its verdict be a recommendation of death, shall designate in writing,
signed by the foreman of the jury, the aggravating circumstance or circumstances
which it found beyond a reasonable doubt. In non-jury cases the judge shall make
such designation. Except in cases of treason or aircraft hijacking, unless at least
one of the statutory aggravating circumstances enumerated in section 27-2534.1(b)
is so found, the death penalty shall not be imposed.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 164 n.9 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1 (Supp. 1975)).
31. The petitioner, a hitchhiker, shot two men who stopped to give him a ride. 428
U.S. at 158-59. The killings took place so the petitioner could rob the men and steal
their car. Id. at 159. At the penalty stage, the judge charged the jury to recommend
either life imprisonment or the death sentence depending on its consideration of mitigat-
ing and aggravating factors. Id. at 160-61.
32. Id. at 200. The petitioner contested the imposition of the death penalty based
on the jury's finding that a murder was committed in the course of another capital
felony (armed robbery), and upon the finding that the murder was committed to obtain
the victims' automobile and money. Id. at 205-06.
33. Id. at 187. The Gregg Court held that "the death penalty is not a form of
punishment that may never be imposed, regardless of the circumstances of the offense,
regardless of the character of the offender, and regardless of the procedure followed in
reaching the decision to impose it." Id.
34. Id. at 197. The Court determined that Georgia's capital sentencing scheme had
been rectified since Furman. The Court summarized:
No longer can a Georgia jury do as Furman's jury did: reach a finding of the
defendant's guilt and then, without guidance or direction, decide whether he
should live or die. Instead, the jury's attention is directed to the specific circum-
stances of the crime: Was it committed in the course of another capital felony?
Was is committed for money? Was it committed upon a peace officer or judicial
officer? Was it committed in a particularly heinous way or in a manner that endan-
gered the lives of many persons?
Id.
35. 428 U.S. at 206. The Court noted that the Georgia statute utilized in Furman
failed to guide juries, allowing them to impose the death penalty in a way that could
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In Eddings v. Oklahoma,36 the Court dealt with the other major fo-
cus in capital appeals as it emphasized the need to ensure that a capital
defendant's case is adequately presented to a sentencing body.37 In Ed-
dings, a sixteen year-old boy who was raised in a harsh family setting
killed a policeman.3" The trial judge sentenced the boy to death be-
cause aggravating circumstances outweighed the only mitigating factor
only be called "freakish." Id. Now the Court would not stand for any process which
lacked uniformity and enabled a jury to act wantonly or capriciously. Id. at 204-07. In
this case, the safeguards of a bifurcated trial that separated the sentencing and guilt
stages, and an automatic review by the Supreme Court of Georgia for the appropriate-
ness of death penalty imposition appeased the Court. Id. at 163-66. See Proffitt v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 259 (1976) (plurality opinion) (explaining that Florida's capital
sentencing procedure satisfied the Eighth Amendment because the trial judges had spe-
cific guidance from enumerated aggravating and mitigating factors, plus a requirement
to put their reasons in writing for a death sentence which ensures effective appellate
review). But see Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 429-34 (1980) (plurality opinion)
(explaining that a trial judge cannot simply read sentencing instructions to a jury with-
out explaining their meaning); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (stating that the
trial judge's rejection of the jury's recommendation of a life sentence in favor of the
death penalty based on a confidential defective presentence report, which only the judge
reviewed, was constitutionally defective because it was based on a confidential
presentence report); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (explaining that a
mandatory death sentencing scheme simply "papers over" the problem of unguided and
unbridled jury discretion).
36. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
37. Id. at 112. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). In Enmund, the Flor-
ida Supreme Court affirmed a death penalty without evidence that the defendant killed
or intended to kill. The defendant had taken part in a robbery in which his co-felons
killed an elderly couple. Florida law made Enmund a constructive aider and abettor
and hence a principal in first degree murder susceptible to the death penalty. Id. at 788.
The Court rejected Florida's use of the death penalty because it did not focus on the
defendant's individual culpability. Id. at 801. See also Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862
(1983) (upholding the jury's selection of the death penalty for a defendant who mur-
dered while an escapee from prison because the sentencing stage gave "individualized"
attention to the defendant's character and the circumstances of the crime); Proffitt v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (plurality opinion) (holding that a Florida sentencing au-
thority properly focused on defendant's prior criminal record, duress, role in the crime,
and age to determine the strength of mitigating evidence); Williams v. New York, 337
U.S. 241 (1948). In Williams, despite a jury recommendation of life imprisonment, the
trial judge's imposition of the death penalty was upheld when the judge accessed a
presentence investigation of the defendant's background that was unavailable for view
in open court. The court stated that the ultimate sentencing authority should possess
the greatest quantity of evidence about the defendant, even if some evidence is inadmis-
sible at the guilt stage.
38. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 106-07. A police officer pulled over the car that the youth
was driving. When the officer approached the car, Eddings shot the officer with a shot-
gun. Id. at 106. The trial court granted the State's motion to allow the boy to stand
trial as an adult despite the fact that there was evidence that the defendant's emotional
1992]
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the judge recognized, the boy's age.39 The trial judge failed to con-
sider, in mitigation, the youth's upbringing and emotional distur-
bances.' The Court held that it is a violation of the Eighth
Amendment for a sentencing authority to refuse to consider any rele-
vant mitigating factors.41 Justice O'Connor, in concurrence, empha-
sized that the qualitative difference between death sentences and other
punishments is the consideration of the character of the capital defend-
ant and the circumstances of his offense which may render a death
sentence unfounded.42
Recently, in Mills v. Maryland,43 the Court had the opportunity to
consider the adequacy of objective safeguards for the capital sentencing
authority and the need to individualize a capital defendant. In Mills, a
petitioner convicted of first-degree murder" challenged his sentence on
the grounds that the jury unconstitutionally imposed a mandatory
death sentence and failed to adequately consider mitigating evidence.45
The Court reasoned that the jury could have understood the Maryland
sentencing statute to mandate the death penalty when the jury unani-
and mental development was much lower than normal for a person of the defendant's
age. Id.
39. Id. at 108-09.
40. Id. at 109.
41. Id. at 112. The Court referred to a rule requiring that all circumstances and
propensities of the offender be taken into account to mitigate any aggravating factors.
Id. (explaining that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require a sentencing au-
thority to consider any mitigating factor offered to achieve a sentence less than death
(citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978))).
42. 455 U.S. at 117-19 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The "Court has gone to ex-
traordinary measures to ensure that the prisoner sentenced to be executed is afforded
process that will guarantee, as much as is humanly possible, that the sentence was not
imposed out of whim, passion, prejudice, or mistake." Id. at 118.
43. 108 S. Ct. 1860 (1988).
44. The petitioner stabbed his cellmate in a Maryland correctional institute. He
offered as mitigating factors his youth, mental infirmity, lack of future dangerousness,
and the state's failed attempt at meaningful rehabilitation. Id. at 1863.
45. Id. at 1863-64. According to the petitioner, the court's instructions allowed for
capital punishment even if each juror agreed mitigating evidence existed. The petitioner
argued that the death penalty would have been imposed even if each juror believed that
some mitigating circumstance existed. The death penalty would be avoided only upon
unanimous agreement on the existence of the same mitigating circumstance. Id. at
1864. Thus, the instruction would have effectively removed the jury from the sentenc-
ing process simply because they could not agree on offered mitigating evidence. See
infra note 54 and accompanying text citing instances in which a sentencer could not be
precluded from considering any aspect of the defendant's character or circumstances of
the offense offered in mitigation.
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mously found an aggravating circumstance, but when no unanimity ex-
isted as to any particular mitigating circumstance.46 Therefore, even if
some jurors recognized a mitigating circumstance, they could not con-
sider it unless all of the jurors valued that same factor. The Court held
that a death sentence cannot be upheld when reasonable jurors may
believe that they are to discount mitigating evidence which is not unan-
imously accepted.47 Hence, the Court demonstrated that even detailed
guidelines for a sentencing authority will be insufficient when they do
not comport with the necessity of incorporating all mitigating evidence
into a jury's analysis.
In Booth v. Maryland,48 the Supreme Court first explored whether
the Eighth Amendment4 9 prevented a capital sentencing jury from
considering victim impact evidence. After convicting the petitioner on
two counts of murder, 0 the jury heard a presentence report, required
by Maryland law, describing the effects that the crime had on the vic-
tim's family.51 After hearing the emotionally charged statements, the
46. Id. at 1870. The Court found that the jury instructions on how to mark "yes"
and "no" for aggravating and mitigating circumstances were confusing because the jury
could only mark "yes" for an aggravating circumstance if there was unanimity. There-
fore, the jury could have inferred that unanimity was also required to mark "yes" for
finding a mitigating factor. Id. at 1867. Implicit in the Court's holding are the require-
ments that a sentencing jury must have unambiguous instructions and that the sen-
tencer must consider any circumstances that the defendant offers in mitigation.
47. 108 S. Ct. at 1868. In dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist did not find fault with
the jury instructions and proceeded to discuss an issue that the majority never reached.
This question was whether the trial judge improperly allowed into evidence statements
about the victim's personal characteristics. Id. at 1875 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
The Chief Justice stated his belief that Booth should be overruled, and that the investi-
gation report prepared by the victim's brother and sister-in-law in this case would not
violate the Eighth Amendment if a sentencing jury would use it for "a quick glimpse of
the life petitioner chose to extinguish." Id. at 1876 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
48. 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
49. See supra notes 20-42 and accompanying text discussing Eighth Amendment
principles.
50. 482 U.S. at 498. John Booth entered his elderly neighbors' home so he could
steal money to buy heroin. Id. at 497-98. Booth knew that the victims could identify
him, so he stabbed them both. Id. at 498. The jury found Booth guilty of two counts of
first-degree murder, two counts of robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery. Id.
51. Id. at 498-500. The Maryland victim impact statement law in relevant part,
required the report to:
1992]
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jury sentenced the petitioner to death.5" The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to determine whether the presentation of victim impact evi-
dence confficts with the Eighth Amendment.53 The Court found that
the information was irrelevant to the capital sentencing decision and
creates the risk that the death penalty will be imposed based on consti-
tutionally impermissible grounds.54 The Court reiterated the fact that
the sentencing authority must focus on the defendants as "uniquely
individual human being[s]." 55 Therefore, the Court held that the use
of a victim impact statement in a capital sentencing hearing is tanta-
(iv) Describe any change in the victim's personal welfare or familial relationships
as a result of the offense;
(v) Identify any request for psychological services initiated by the victim or the
victim's family as a result of the offense; and
(vi) Contain any other information related to'the impact of the offense upon the
victim or the victim's family that the trial court requires.
482 U.S. at 499 (citing MD. ANN. CODE art. 41 § 4-609(c)(3) (1986)).
52. 482 U.S. at 501. The jury sentenced Booth to death for the murder of Mr.
Bronstein and life imprisonment for Mrs. Bronstein's murder.
The victim impact statement used in Booth is located at 482 U.S. at 509-15 (appendix
to opinion of the Court). The statement contained descriptions of emotional and per-
sonal problems the family faced after the murders, particularly the effects on the vic-
tims' son, daughter, and granddaughter. Id. For instance, the son noted he is sad when
he sees old people, and is aware when it is 4:00 p.m. because that was the time he found
his murdered parents. Id. at 511-12.
53. 479 U.S. 882 (1986).
54. 482 U.S. at 502-03. The Court decided that a capital sentencing hearing does
not require the admission of every possible foreseeable consequence of a crime. Id. at
504. The Court believed that although a wide range of foreseeable consequences is "rel-
evant in other criminal and civil contexts, we cannot agree that it is relevant in the
unique circumstance of a capital sentencing hearing." Id. The Court felt that this
would ensure that factors unrelated to the defendant's blameworthiness could not cloud
the jury's task. Id. The Court feared that victim impact statements could promote
arbitrary decision-making. Id. at 505. Furthermore, the Court was aware of the danger
that could result when identical situations arose, but where only one victim left behind a
family or only one's family could articulate its sense of loss. Id. The Court also found
that such evidence shifts the hearing from the defendant to "mini-trial[s]" regarding
victim impact and character. Id. at 507. This type of evidence does not lend itself to a
rebuttal. Id. at 506-07.
It is critical to note that victim impact evidence is not excluded in every capital sen-
tencing context. Sometimes information may be admissible because it relates directly to
the circumstances of the crime. Id. at 507 n.10. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2) (peacea-
ble nature of victim may rebut charge that victim was aggressor); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1751,
1111 (1988) (death sentence authorized for assassinating President or Vice President of
the United States).
55. 482 U.S. at 504 (citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976)
(plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, J.J.)).
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mount to "cruel and unusual punishment.",1 6
In dissent, Justice White attacked the majority's refusal to defer to a
state's determination of which elements constitute the harm in a
crime.57 According to Justice White, a capital sentencing jury could
properly consider the "full extent" of a crime, including harm to the
victim's family, instead of only considering the criminal's "internal dis-
position."5" Additionally, Justice White questioned the logic of possi-
bly enhancing punishment with victim impact evidence for noncapital
defendants, while forbidding it in capital cases.59 Finally, Justice
White noted that the state has an interest in counteracting the abun-
dance of mitigating evidence that a defendant may introduce.' Justice
White explained that the state should be able to remind the sentencing
authority that although the capital defendant needs to be considered an
individual, "so too is the victim whose death represents a unique loss to
society and in particular to his family.",61
Justice Scalia offered a brief dissent attacking the majority's founda-
tion for improperly citing moral guilt as the sole determinant for capi-
56. 482 U.S. at 502-03. The Court also ruled unconstitutional a less common class
of victim impact evidence allowed in the Maryland law. The victim's daughter stated
the following to the jury, explaining that she:
[C]ould never forgive anyone for killing [her parents] that way. She can't believe
that anybody could do that to someone. The victims' daughter states that animals
wouldn't do this. [The perpetrators] didn't have to kill because there was no one to
stop them from looting. ... The murders show the viciousness of the killers' anger.
She doesn't feel that the people who did this could ever be rehabilitated and she
doesn't want them to be able to do this again or put another family through this.
Id. at 508.
Such evidence was considered to have no purpose other than to inflame the jury. Id.
at 508-09. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (evidence may be excluded for tending to have preju-
dicial effects).
57. 482 U.S. at 515 (White, J., dissenting). "[Tihe Court should recognize that '[i]n
a democratic society legislatures, not courts, are constituted to respond to the will and
consequently the moral values of the people.'" Id. (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 383 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)).
58. 482 U.S. at 516 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White analogized that someone
who drives recklessly through a stoplight and kills someone is just as blameworthy as
one who also runs the light but does not kill anyone. Id. He explained that most people
would not have a problem punishing the two people with equal moral guilt unequally.
Id.
59. Id. at 516-17 (White, J., dissenting). But see McCoy, supra note 6, at 347
("[Tlhis distinction does make sense when one considers the death penalty's irrevocable
nature.").
60. 482 U.S. at 517 (White, J., dissenting).
61. Id.
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tal punishment.6 2 Instead, Justice Scalia suggested that personal
responsibility based on the degree of harm that a defendant causes
should constitute the critical measure.6 3
The Court next addressed the constitutionality of victim impact evi-
dence in South Carolina v. Gathers." In Gathers, the prosecutor com-
mented about the victim's personal qualities at the defendant's
sentencing hearing. 6' The jury also heard a quotation from a religious
passage which the victim was carrying at the time of his murder.66 The
defendant was unaware of the victim's possession of the passage. 67 The
Court concluded that the prosecutor's statements were of the same na-
ture as those in Booth and remanded the case.68 Gathers therefore ex-
tended the Court's holding in Booth and precluded a sentencing jury
from considering prosecutor's statements about the victim's circum-
stances that are unknown to the defendant when the crime was
committed.6 9
62. Id. at 519-20 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia found the Court's opinion in
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987), dispositive on the proposition that moral guilt is
not the only element relevant in capital sentencing. In Tison two brothers were exe-
cuted for the major role they played in their father's escape from prison, during which
he killed four people. 481 U.S. at 140-41. The death sentence was unrelated to the
brothers' blameworthiness, but rather it followed from their accountability in their ma-
jor role in the escape. Id. at 158. The jury sentenced the brothers based on the extent of
the harm committed. Id.
63. 482 U.S. at 519-20 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
64. 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
65. Id. at 808-10. The defendant and three companions beat a 31 year-old man who
referred to himself as "Reverend Minister." Id. at 806-07. The victim was sitting on a
park bench when he was attacked, and he had religious articles used for preaching in his
possession. Id. After the attack, the defendant sexually assaulted the victim with an
umbrella. Id. at 807. The defendant was found guilty of murder and first-degree crimi-
nal sexual conduct. Id. at 807-08.
66. Id. at 808-09. The prosecutor emphasized the religious nature of the victim,
and commented on his lack of "fame or fortune." Id. at 809. In addition, the prosecu-
tor quoted in its entirety a religious tract in the victim's possession when he was killed.
The tract, entitled "The Game Guy's Prayer," used football and boxing metaphors to
describe how to act as a good person. Id. at 808-09.
67. Id. at 811.
68. 490 U.S. at 810. The court did not see a difference in victim impact statements
made by a prosecutor rather than the victim's survivors. Id. at 810-11.
69. Id. at 811. There was no evidence that the attackers read any items the victim
possessed, making any claim of their relevance to the circumstances of the crime unsup-
ported. I. The Court considered it "purely fortuitous" that the victim happened to
possess items which could emotionally impact a jury. Id. at 812. Furthermore, the
Court precluded admitting such evidence even when a prosecutor incorporates it into
arguments to the sentencing body. Id. at 811-12. See, e.g., Eric S. Newman, Note,
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Justice O'Connor, in dissent, rejected a rigid view of Booth and sided
against precluding prosecutorial comment about the victim.70 Justice
O'Connor explained that the prosecutor has the right to show the jury
facts about the victim especially at sentencing when a broader scope of
evidence is admissible.7 1 Justice O'Connor also argued that because
retribution is a goal of the death penalty, the defendant's punishment
should be commensurate with the harm. 2 Thus, Justice O'Connor did
not believe that the Eighth Amendment necessitated the portrayal of a
victim as a "faceless stranger" at a capital trial.73
Justice Scalia, dissenting, also voiced his rejection of the Booth hold-
Eighth Amendment - Prosecutorial Comment Regarding the Victim's Personal Quali-
ties Should Not Be Permitted At The Sentencing Phase Of A Capital Trial, 80 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1236, 1251 (1990) (explaining the impropriety of a sentencing jury
to decide a defendant's fate by subjectively valuing a prosecutor's arguments concerning
the victim's personal qualities).
70. 490 U.S. at 814 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy, maintained that Booth was incorrectly decided,
but declared that the Gathers majority could have ruled differently without undoing
that precedent. Id. at 813-14. In support of this contention, Justice O'Connor pointed
to the alternative readings that lower courts had applied to Booth. The South Carolina
Supreme Court read Booth to say that any injection of the victim's personal characteris-
tics at sentencing violates the Eighth Amendment. South Carolina v. Gathers, 369
S.E.2d 140, 144 (S.C. 1988). Other jurisdictions, however, did not consider Booth to
hold that a prosecutor is precluded from arguing about a victim's personal characteris-
tics. See Daniels v. State, 528 N.E.2d 775, 782 (Ind. 1988) (distinguishing Booth from a
situation where prosecutor's remarks referred to information adduced as evidence at
trial); Moon v. State, 375 S.E.2d 442, 450 (Ga. 1988) (stating that the "mere mention"
of facts about the victim, developed at trial, that are not outside the realm of the "cir-
cumstances of the crime" will not always be problematic (quoting Brooks v. Kemp, 762
F.2d 1383, 1409 (11th Cir. 1985))).
71. 490 U.S. at 816-17 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In this instance, the jury listened
to the defendant's mother, sister, cousin, and sixth grade teacher offer plausible mitigat-
ing evidence that the defendant was an affectionate, caring person. Id. at 817. Justice
O'Connor explained that the prosecutor should have an opportunity to speak about the
victim's characteristics because at sentencing "[e]vidence extraneous to the crime itself
is deemed relevant." Id.
72. Id. at 818 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183
(1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, J.J.)). But see Newman, supra note 69,
at 1249-50 (opposing Justice O'Connor's use of Tison for the proposition that punish-
ment should equal the harm caused in all situations, because Tison applied the death
penalty due to the murders themselves, not whom the victims were).
73. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 821 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor saw no
constitutional infringement when a prosecutor tells the jury that the victim was "an
ordinary citizen" who felt that he could sit on a public park bench "without the risk of
death." Id. at 820.
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ing.74 He urged the Court not to succumb to the "freshness" of Booth,
but rather to remove it from the books quickly and minimize its effects
on state and federal laws.75
Payne v. Tennessee 76 gave the United States Supreme Court the op-
portunity to reconsider Booth and Gathers.77 The Court overruled
Booth and Gathers78 and held that the Eighth Amendment does not
erect a per se barrier to the admission of victim impact evidence to a
capital sentencing jury.79 The Court rejected prior suppositions that
victim impact evidence does not reflect the defendant's blameworthi-
ness, and that only blameworthiness is important in the capital sen-
tencing decision.80 The Court instead favored freedom for states to
devise methods to be used to inform a sentencing authority about the
specific harms resulting from a crime."1 The Court legitimized the use
of victim impact evidence, finding nothing "cruel and unusual" about a
family's testimony or a prosecutor relaying "the human cost of the
crime" to the jury. 2
74. Id. at 823-25 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 824. Justice Scalia argued for promptly overruling Booth to preserve soci-
ety's standard of focusing on the specific harm when administering criminal punish-
ment. Id. at 823. He documented other instances where the Court had overruled prior
decisions within relatively short periods of time. Id. See, eg., Daniels v. Williams, 474
U.S. 327 (1986) (overruling Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981) and holding that a
state official's negligent act does not implicate the Due Process Clause).
76. 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
77. Brief for Respondent at 11, Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991) (No. 90-
5721) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent] (arguing that Booth and Gathers promulgated
rules which improperly prevented juries from punishing defendants for the full extent of
the harm caused).
78. The Court did not disrupt that portion of Booth which held that evidence of a
family's characterizations and opinions about the defendant and the proper sentence
violated the Eighth Amendment. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2611 n.2. For an example of this
type of evidence, see supra note 5.
79. 111 S. Ct. at 2609.
80. Id. at 2605. The Court proceeded to cite the Federal Sentencing Guidelines of
1987, explaining that the guidelines provide for calibrated sentences based on subjective
guilt and the amount of harm caused so as to allow a court flexibility within each
crime's circumstances. Id. at 2605-06. The Court, however, did not cite specific exam-
ples of the operation of the guidelines.
81. Id. at 2607-08. See also Brief for Respondent, supra note 77, at 16-17 (arguing
that Booth and Gathers mistakenly take away the state's authority to choose substantive
factors relevant to capital sentencing decisions).
82. 111 S. Ct. at 2609. The Court mentioned that victim impact evidence does not
attempt to encourage comparisons from one type of victim to another. Id. at 2607.
However, the Court's ipse dixit does not respond to the petitioner's argument that a
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The Court determined that victim impact evidence serves a legiti-
mate purpose in criminal justice, and neither promotes jury capricious-
ness nor limits the sentencing authority's consideration of mitigating
evidence.8 3 A majority of the Court sided with Booth's dissent and
decided that proper punishment for a murder can only occur when the
jury individualizes both the murderer and the victim.84 The Court em-
phasized the fact that, in a capital sentencing hearing, almost no limits
are placed on the defendant's introduction of relevant mitigating evi-
dence.8" The Court thought it important to offer the jury "a glimpse of
the life" that the defendant "chose to extinguish." 86 The Court ex-
plained that victim impact evidence should only be excluded when it
infringes upon the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 7
Justice Souter's concurrence stems from his understanding of a legal
tradition which has never categorically excluded evidence about a
crime's effects.88 Justice Souter contended that murder has the foresee-
able consequences of leaving "survivors" whom the crime will affect.8 9
sentencer will become "society's agent" to "implement social prejudice" based on the
victim's appeal to the jury. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at 23.
83. 111 S. Ct. at 2606-08. The Court claimed that the Booth opinion erred by con-
struing the Court's earlier mandate that a capital defendant be considered a "uniquely
individual human being" to mean that a class of evidence (evidence not specific to the
defendant or the criminal act) could not be considered at sentencing. Id at 2607 (quot-
ing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976)). Rather, the Court said that
that language guaranteed consideration of mitigating evidence for a defendant, and that
it had no bearing on allowing other evidence for the prosecution. The result of not
allowing the introduction of victim impact evidence results in a scale that is "unfairly
weighted" towards the defendant in a capital trial. Id. The Court explained that al-
lowing prosecutorial use of victim impact evidence to oppose the defendant's use of
mitigating factors will make the scales more equally weighted. Id.
84. Id. at 2608.
85. Id.
86. Id. (citing Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 397 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting)).
87. 111 S. Ct. at 2608. The Court explained that "if evidence is introduced that is
so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair, the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a mechanism for relief." Id.
88. Id. at 2614 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter views the harmful impact on
the victim's family as a foreseeable consequence of a murder.
89. Justice Souter explained that:
Every defendant knows, if endowed with the mental competence for criminal re-
sponsibility, that the life he will take by his homicidal behavior is that of a unique
person, like himself, and that the person to be killed probably has close associates,
'survivors,' who will suffer harms and deprivations from the victim's death.
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Therefore, the defendant need not foresee in detail how his "choice
necessarily relates to a whole human being. '
Justices Marshall and Stevens dissented in support of the precedent
in Booth.91 Justice Marshall adhered to concerns that victim impact
evidence allows deviation from the defendant's culpability, and pro-
motes arbitrary jury decisions based on the eloquence of a victim's
family.92
Justice Stevens, in dissent, looked beyond stare decisis doctrine and
viewed Payne as a "sharp break" from the Court's understanding of
the Eighth Amendment.93 Justice Stevens claimed that the majority is
guilty of resting its opinion on political appeal rather than reasoned
jurisprudence.94 He added that the Constitution grants a defendant
special protection from an overly powerful state, and discredited the
argument that victim impact evidence is necessary to balance the de-
fendant's introduction of mitigating evidence.95 Finally, Justice Ste-
vens emphasized that victim impact evidence should not enter the
sentencing decision because it relates to harm recognized after a crimi-
nal act. Justice Stevens asserted that the majority illogically analogizes
Id. at 2615 (Souter, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 2615-16 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter also saw the continuance
of the Booth holding as promoting arbitrariness. Id. at 2616. He noted that some evi-
dence that is commonly produced at the guilt-phase of a trial technically can be classi-
fied as victim impact evidence (that is, what job the victim held and whether the victim
has surviving family members). Id. at 2616-17. He suggests that to comply with Booth,
specific facts unknown to the defendant would have to be excluded at trial to ensure
that the jury would not later refer to them at sentencing. Id. at 2617. This, he feared,
would deprive jurors of needed contextual information and reduce their comprehension
of the crime. Id.
91. 111 S. Ct. at 2619 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall saw the change in
the Court's position on victim impact evidence as attributable solely to the additions of
Justices Kennedy and Souter. Id. Justice Marshall warned that this may indicate the
Court's future "defiance" of established principles of constitutional liberties. Id.
92. Id. at 2620.
93. Id. at 2625 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens started with the premise
that a capital sentence can only be the product of the jury's consideration of evidence
about the "character of the offense and the character of the defendant." Id. at 2626.
94. Id. at 2627, 2631 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens noted the popularity
of a tough stand on crime must not influence the Court to compromise judicial reason-
ing. Id. at 2627.
95. 111 S. Ct. at 2627. As an example of the rules of evidence weighing in the
defendant's favor, Justice Stevens pointed to a defendant's ability to introduce evidence
of a good reputation to establish a law abiding nature, coupled with the ban on the
prosecution to refer to the defendant's character to prove criminal propensities. Id. at
2627-28. See also FED. R. EVID. 404(a).
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the case for victim impact evidence with instances where the harm dic-
tates the sentence because the harm defines the crime before the act.96
The Supreme Court's. decision in Payne is inconsistent with this
country's tenets of criminal law. First, victim impact evidence has no
relation to the cornerstones of the American penal system: the criminal
act, its relation to the defendant's state of mind, and advance public
warning about applicable punishments.97 Notwithstanding its elabora-
tion of the totality of harm, Justice Stevens's dissent sufficiently illus-
trates that victim impact evidence only becomes relevant to a capital
sentencing authority when the resulting harm was foreseeable.9 s Sec-
ond, the decision functionally establishes a capital sentencing system
not based on guidance and consistency.99 The "irrevocable nature" of
the death penalty warrants a more objective jury analysis than one left
to the whim of a prosecutor, appealing to emotions, prejudices, and
values." Moreover, the Court's previous desire for states to distin-
guish between a capital and non-capital murder may become
impossible. 0'
Another realistic concern is that a capital sentencing hearing may
now become a prolonged "side-show" concerning victim impact evi-
dence.' 012 The jury may easily become distracted, and confuse the real
96. 111 S. Ct. at 2628-29 & n.2. An example of this is the imposition of the death
penalty for assassinating the President. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. Jus-
tice Stevens stated that it is improper for the majority to attempt to make a case for
victim impact evidence by showing other instances where criminal punishment looks to
the amount of harm caused. Id. at 2628. He used Justice White's analogy of two drunk
drivers with the same amount of moral guilt facing different sentences only because one
killed someone while driving. Id. at 2629. See supra note 58 for an explanation of the
analogy. Justice Stevens explains that the analogy is fully consistent with Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence. 111 S. Ct. at 2629. Harm is foreseeable to the actor who
drives drunk, and he or she knows in advance that the legislature establishes more se-
vere penalties for that class of harm. Id. Conversely, one does not commit victim im-
pact evidence, one commits a murder which arbitrarily may produce an impact on a
family. Id.
97. See generally LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 6, at §§ 1.2(b), 3.1.
98. See supra notes 93-96 (discussing Justice Stevens's dissent in Payne).
99. It seems difficult to overcome the argument that rather than uniformly applying
the death penalty, courts allowing victim impact evidence will allow capital sentencing
juries to value victims as a way to determine which defendants will die. See generally
Newman, supra note 69; Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at 23.
100. See McCoy, supra note 6, at 347.
101. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at 26-27.
102. See Booth, 482 U.S. at 506-07. The Court in Booth noted the difficulty of
preventing a shift in the focus from the defendant to the information regarding the
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issues when focusing on a family member's testimony. In addition, the
Court has no constitutional support for suggesting that a sentencing
hearing should be a symmetrical presentation of the State's case and
the defendant's mitigating evidence. 10 3
The Court's recent personnel changes have resulted in a diminution
of the Eighth Amendment's safeguards. By allowing victim impact ev-
idence at a capital sentencing hearing, the Court accedes to the grow-
ing victim's rights mobilization," and depreciates the Constitution's
charge to forbid "cruel and unusual punishment."10 5 The Court has
signaled an expansive role for capital punishment. Hopefully, states
will conscientiously decide, in light of the Court's recent fluctuation,
that the ultimate criminal sentence is misplaced when there remains
the possibility that two criminals could commit identical actus rei with
only one paying with his life.
David A. Goldberg*
victim. The Booth Court was aware of the inherent dangers that could result. Id. at
506. The Court alluded to the idea that the defendant would be forced to take the
offensive, and in so doing, the trial could appear to the jury as centering on the defend-
ant's ability to discredit the victim's family's testimony. Id. at 506-07. Since such testi-
mony is difficult to rebut, the jury may become confused and base the defendant's
sentence on his failure to do so. Id. at 507.
103. See supra note 95 noting the difference in the abilty of the defense attorney
and the prosecutor to bring up the defendant's character under the Federal Rules of
Evidence.
104. For an historical explanation of the victim's rights movement, see generally
Carrington & Nicholson, supra note 2.
105. See supra note 5 for the language of the Eighth Amendment.
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